Mapping digital media: digital television, the public interest, and European regulation by Iosifidis, P.
Iosifidis, P. (2012). Mapping digital media: digital television, the public interest, and European 
regulation (Report No. 17). New York, USA: Open Society Foundations.
City Research Online
Original citation: Iosifidis, P. (2012). Mapping digital media: digital television, the public interest, and 
European regulation (Report No. 17). New York, USA: Open Society Foundations.
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/1768/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
REFERENCE SERIES NO. 17
DIGITAL TELEVISION, THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST, AND EUROPEAN REGULATION 
MAPPING DIGITAL MEDIA: 
By Petros Iosifidis
Digital Television, the Public Interest, 
and European Regulation
W R I T T E N  B Y
Petros Iosiﬁ dis1
Discussion of digital television has focused on switch-over dates, set-top boxes and the technical and economic 
implications of switch-over. Th is paper, by contrast, focusses on public interest obligations and citizenship 
values such as freedom, access, universality, political pluralism and content diversity. 
Petros Iosiﬁ dis distinguishes broadly between public interest priorities as unde rstood in western Europe, and 
in central and eastern Europe. After assessing some obvious beneﬁ ts of digital TV (extra channels, converged 
communications, enhanced interactivity and mobility), he argues that the public interest outcomes from the 
introduction of new technologies like the internet and digital TV will depend on how people use them, for 
new technology is only a vehicle by means of which public interest goals can be achieved.
He then considers digital TV penetration data from across Europe, as well as the status of national digital 
switch-over plans, stressing that northern Europe is much more advanced in this regard than southern and 
eastern-central Europe. 
Outlining the pros and cons of digital switch-over for the public, Dr Iosiﬁ dis contends that universality and 
accessibility can best be ensured by maintaining public service media, which have been—and should continue 
to be—important conveyors of freely accessible and reliable information. Countries where television has been 
dominated by state broadcasters should use the new technology and in particular digital switch-over to create 
independent non-proﬁ t channels at both local and national levels, to foster a competitive environment and 
political pluralism. 
January 2012
1. Petros Iosiﬁ dis is Reader (Associate Professor) in Media Policy at City University London.
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Mapping Digital Media
Th e values that underpin good journalism, the need of citizens for reliable and abundant information, and 
the importance of such information for a healthy society and a robust democracy: these are perennial, and 
provide compass-bearings for anyone trying to make sense of current changes across the media landscape.
Th e standards in the profession are in the process of being set. Most of the eﬀ ects on journalism imposed 
by new technology are shaped in the most developed societies, but these changes are equally inﬂ uencing the 
media in less developed societies.
Th e Media Program of the Open Society Foundations has seen how changes and continuity aﬀ ect the media in 
diﬀ erent places, redeﬁ ning the way they can operate sustainably while staying true to values of pluralism and 
diversity, transparency and accountability, editorial independence, freedom of expression and information, 
public service, and high professional standards.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project, which examines these changes in-depth, aims to build bridges between 
researchers and policy-makers, activists, academics and standard-setters across the world. 
Th e project assesses, in the light of these values, the global opportunities and risks that are created for media 
by the following developments:
 the switchover from analog broadcasting to digital broadcasting
 growth of new media platforms as sources of news
 convergence of traditional broadcasting with telecommunications.
As part of this endeavor, the Open Society Media Program has commissioned introductory papers on a range 
of issues, topics, policies and technologies that are important for understanding these processes. Each paper 
in the Reference Series is authored by a recognised expert, academic or experienced activist, and is written 
with as little jargon as the subject permits. 
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Th e reference series accompanies reports into the impact of digitization in 60 countries across the world. 
Produced by local researchers and partner organizations in each country, these reports examine how these 
changes aﬀ ect the core democratic service that any media system should provide – news about political, 
economic and social aﬀ airs. Cumulatively, these reports will provide a much-needed resource on the 
democratic role of digital media.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project builds policy capacity in countries where this is less developed, 
encouraging stakeholders to participate and inﬂ uence change. At the same time, this research creates a 
knowledge base, laying foundations for advocacy work, building capacity and enhancing debate. 
Th e Mapping Digital Media is a project of the Open Society Media Program, in collaboration with the 
Open Society Information Program.  
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I. Introduction: The Elusive Concept 
 of Public Interest in Television 
 Systems Across Europe
Th e term “public interest” is broad, vague, and loosely constructed. It changes over time and from diﬀ erent 
perspectives, so that deﬁ ning it is notoriously diﬃ  cult. In relation to the media, one might argue that 
something counts as being in the public interest only if it serves the aims of all those who participate in public 
communication and not just those of a minority. Th e idea of public interest is sometimes used to refer to the 
collective cultural, political, social, and informational beneﬁ ts to a society, which serve both the democratic 
processes of political participation and cultural, social, and economic well-being.2 
A thorny issue for media and communications is whether regulatory intervention in a free market can be 
justiﬁ ed on public interest grounds.3 In the media politics of western societies, debates about the public 
interest in mass media, particularly television, have focussed on the central issue of whether a regulated system 
or a free market can best deliver public interest goals such as political pluralism, cultural diversity, access, and 
choice. Th e western European broadcasting system is not uniform, for there are striking diﬀ erences between 
countries’ media freedom and government interference, with the media in northern Europe enjoying greater 
political and economic independence than their counterparts in Europe’s southern and Mediterranean 
regions. However, taken as a whole, the western European broadcasting model is far more interventionist 
than, say, the American. 
Th e diﬀ erences between an interventionist and non-interventionist approach can be shown by comparing 
the traditionally heavily regulated European broadcasting system, which emphasizes the time-honored triad 
of education, information, and entertainment, with the American commercial system, which prioritizes 
individual freedom of speech and is characterized by minimal regulation. While the U.S. broadcasting model 
2. D. McQuail, Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest, Sage, London, 1992, p. 3.
3. P. Iosiﬁ dis, Global Media and Communication Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2011a, pp. 45–92.
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is based on the free-market principles of demand and supply as the appropriate means of providing universal 
access and content to satisfy all consumers, the western European model in its ideal typical form pays more 
attention to the obligations and needs of the citizen as an active member of a collective society than to 
consumer choice and individual freedom. 
I.1 Western Europe
Th e concept of public interest in western European broadcasting is based on the following principles: 
 program diversity;
 the availability of good-quality, innovative, and risk-taking programs;
 the reﬂ ection of national identity and culture;
 catering for minority interests;
 the provision of impartial news and current aﬀ airs;
 freedom of speech;
 universality of coverage. 
Th ese have traditionally been met by implementing heavy content and structural broadcasting regulation. 
But also as a reaction to the increasingly competitive media landscape and technological convergence, 
European policymakers have since the 1980s adopted re-regulatory measures (the introduction of “light,” 
ﬂ exible and converged regulatory frameworks) designed to allow large market players to expand across sectors 
and compete globally. 
Converged communications regulation is already evident in countries like the UK which set up the Oﬃ  ce 
of Communications (Ofcom) as an integrated regulatory body in 2003. Th e European Union’s 2007 
Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS) Directive fosters re-regulation (the abolition of strict sector-speciﬁ c 
rules) and—together with the 2009 Telecoms Reform Package—opts for converged regulation as a response 
to fully digitized communications systems.4 But it has been argued that the re-regulatory trends result in 
the “commercialisation of the public discourse” and the “commodiﬁ cation of the public.”5 Th ese trends are 
accompanied by a reliance on general competition law to deliver public interest objectives. 
4. Th e 2009 Telecoms Reforms Package, updating the EU Telecoms Rules of 2002, aims at bringing more competition to Europe’s telecoms mar-
kets, better and cheaper ﬁ xed, mobile, and internet services, and faster internet connections for all Europeans. It also provides for the creation 
of a new body of European telecom regulators, dubbed BEREC (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications). Th e package 
was expected to be transposed into national law in all EU member states by June 2011. However, by the end of 2011, only 12 member states 
had done so, while 15 states (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain) had still to fully implement all the reforms. Countries that do not comply with the requirements of EU 
law can be referred to the European Court of Justice, which may order EU member countries to implement EU Directives and impose ﬁ nes if 
this is not done. 
5. R.W. McChesney, (1998) “Making Media Democratic,” Boston Review, at: http://bostonreview.net/BR23.3/mcchesney.html.
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However, the preservation of societal values like pluralism, diversity, freedom, and access cannot be guaranteed 
solely by the application of competition law, whose main objective is to eliminate barriers to entry and render 
the markets competitive. Th e protection of public interest values requires sector-speciﬁ c regulation that can 
take the form of media ownership regulation, content rules, and support for public service broadcasting.
I.2 Central and Eastern Europe 
Th e situation is rather diﬀ erent in the post-communist bloc, including the new EU member states from 
central and eastern Europe. Although central and eastern Europe is often presented as a fairly coherent entity, 
diﬀ erences abound between the individual countries and their broadcasting landscapes. According to a major 
research project funded by the European Research Council (ERC), states in the region have experienced 
diﬀ erent patterns of transition from communism to democracy and the free market. In countries like Poland 
and Hungary, transition was eased by “pacts” negotiated between the old and new elites.6 In fact, the Visegrád 
Group (comprising the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) were all smooth transitioners, 
whereas in the south-east, in countries such as Romania, transition was more abrupt and violent. Th e speed 
and scope of constitutional reform across the region also diﬀ ered, as did the speed and scope of market 
reforms after the fall of communism.
Despite all this, the ERC project has identiﬁ ed a number of striking similarities and common features across 
the region, among others: politicization of the state; broadcasting dependence on economic and business 
interests (also evident in much of southern Europe); small underdeveloped and weak media markets; 
privatization of broadcasting outlets; ﬂ oating laws and procedures; and a disoriented journalistic profession.
Th erefore, the public interest priorities in this region include political, economic, and socio-cultural reforms. 
Concerns are raised—more urgently than in western Europe—by issues such as the lack of accountability 
of media market players, the inﬂ uence exerted by commercial operators, the impact of corporate power in 
setting the political agenda, and the limits on freedom of speech and on eﬀ ective participation by citizens in 
society. 
Another major concern is the condition of public service broadcasting, which in the post-communist region 
is still largely perceived as state broadcasting with close connections to political elites, whereas in most 
western European countries, particularly in northern Europe, public institutions enjoy a high degree of 
political and economic independence. Th e introduction of public service broadcasting in post-communist 
countries has either so far failed outright or produced very uncertain results, as public organizations lack 
social embeddedness and the right democratic context in which to operate.7 While in western Europe public 
6. “Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (MDCEE),” An ERC Project based at the Department of Politics and International 
Relations of the University of Oxford in collaboration with the Department of Media and Communications, Th e London School of Economics 
and Political Science University of Oxford. Launched in October 2009. Details available at:  http://mde.politics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/country-
reports.
7. K. Jakubowicz, “Ideas in Our Heads: Introduction of PSB as Part of Media System Change in Central and Eastern Europe,” European Journal 
of Communication 19(1) (2004), p. 54.
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service broadcasting is being actively reassessed, in most parts of central and eastern Europe political elites 
continue to undermine this institution, depriving it of opportunities to become entrenched and mature. 
EU subsidies and policies could play a key role in the reform of state broadcasting. As a rule, the use of 
competition policy with regard to state aid has meant that publicly funded broadcasters have to deﬁ ne clearly 
their public revenues, and this has hampered their opportunities to engage in commercial activities which 
are seen to create market distortions. Th e 2009 European Commission’s Broadcasting Communication 
contains a more eﬀ ective control concerning possible overcompensation and the supervision of the public 
service mission. In principle, it states, overcompensation always constitutes incompatible state aid.8 Th e 
Commission starts from the position that state funding is normally necessary for public broadcasters to carry 
out their public service tasks. 
Th is rigid employment of state aid, however, fails to take into account the social, cultural, and democratic 
functions of the public institutions and the need to protect these areas of opportunity within a communications 
market which has become increasingly deﬁ ned by competitive commercial services. Competition policy in 
relation to state aid fails to conceive information and communication rights as a public good (good accessed by 
all).9 Th is is an issue of concern since communication must be considered as having a signiﬁ cant social worth, 
as well as being understood as an economic commodity. In eﬀ ect, the EU’s neo-liberal competition policies 
may enhance market opportunities, but they fail to recognize the cultural complexities of an audiovisual and 
communications public sphere in eastern and central Europe, where a diverse range of voices is required to 
encourage representation and participation by citizens.
Given the realities of the media, communications, and information environment in that region, however, one 
should not expect state broadcasting alone to play a leading role in establishing a pluralistic system, even if 
is subject to sympathetic state aid policies. Eﬀ orts to reform the bureaucratic and politically controlled state 
broadcasting system (in the direction of editorial integrity) should be accompanied by fostering a non-proﬁ t 
media sector that could include national networks, local stations, and community channels. Government 
policies should ensure that these ventures are accessible to all and subject to a stable source of funding, for 
underfunded channels cannot deliver program quality or guarantee economic and political independence. 
Yet in today’s digital society it is not only television that can contribute to pluralism; another view is that 
social networks or alternative, internet-based media can encompass diverse forms of communication and 
oﬀ er a structural and organizational answer to the issue of plurality.10
8. Communication from the Commission on the application of state aid rules to public service broadcasting, adopted in July 2009, at http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/speciﬁ c_rules.html#broadcasting (accessed ...). (Para. 70 states: “As a matter of principle, since 
overcompensation is not necessary for the operation of the service of general economic interest, it constitutes incompatible State aid that must 
be repaid to the State subject to the clariﬁ cations provided in the present chapter with regard to public service broadcasting.”)
9. M. Wheeler, “Th e European Union’s Competition Directorate: State Aids and Public Service Broadcasting,” in P. Iosiﬁ dis (ed.), Reinventing 
Public Service Communication: European Broadcasters and Beyond (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2010, pp. 59–60.
10. J. Harrison and B. Wessels, “A New Public Service Communication Environment? Public Service Broadcasting Values in the Reconﬁ guring 
Media,” New Media & Society 7(6) (2005), pp. 834–853; K. Jakubowicz, “‘PSB 3.0’: Reinventing European PSB,” in P. Iosiﬁ dis (ed.), Reinventing 
Public Service Communication: European Broadcasters and Beyond , Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2010, pp. 9–23.
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II. Digital Television and the Public 
 Interest
European television has so far witnessed three major phases of development. Th e ﬁ rst phase came to an end in 
the early 1980s, with the loss of public service broadcasting monopolies and the development of commercial 
television transmitted via terrestrial means, cable or satellite. 
Th e mixed economy of that analog era was shaped by the interaction of two concepts. First was the 
“trusteeship” paradigm, which was used to justify the setting up of public service broadcasters and government 
regulation of broadcasting in order to safeguard the public—and the public interest—against the self-interest 
of broadcasters. Th e second was commercial broadcasters, including pay-TV platforms, which delivered 
essentially one-to-many mass communications programming to mass audiences. 
Th e introduction of digital television, starting in the late 1990s, marked the start of the third phase. While the 
mixed economy of the analog era was preserved, its market structure was undermined by the increasing range 
and diversity of communication sources available to the public. In the digital television epoch, audiences can 
choose whether to continue viewing scheduled television or to consume television on the go, on the oﬃ  ce 
computer, on a mobile phone or on a tablet. Th e mass audience of analog TV is increasingly interactive and 
disaggregated. 
Th e average viewer faces a bewildering choice of content, ranging from general areas of interest like sport, 
music, and entertainment, to personalized and niche video content to satisfy individual viewers’ habits. 
Choice is not restricted by live television schedules: the constraints of time and place no longer apply. Add 
an increasing number of catch-up platforms and the entry of innovative Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) 
operators who oﬀ er greater interactivity (for example, Virgin Media TiVo), and the result is greater freedom 
and diversity for the consumer. 
Digital television involves much more than just extra channels; it is the catalyst of converged communications. 
Th e streaming of TV output on the internet, the appearance of the connected TV set, the possibility of 
internet access by mobile telephone technology, the availability of social media communications from mobile 
1 1O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 2
phones and computers, means that over time people will become active self-schedulers by ﬁ nding individual 
programs from sources as diverse as traditional broadcasters or YouTube. Th e mass audience will become 
disaggregated, more active and more empowered by deciding what they want to watch and when. Since 
the internet is global by nature and digital television crosses national barriers, another consequence is that 
dialogue will take place in a global public sphere—to the citizen’s advantage.
However, the public interest outcomes from the introduction of new technologies will depend on how these 
technologies are used. In the end, the beneﬁ ts from digital television and the internet will depend on people. 
Like all new media advances, these technologies can provide a useful tool or basis for a public sphere, but they 
cannot create such a space by themselves. New communications technology is not inherently pro-democratic; 
it can be just as eﬀ ective at sustaining propaganda and authoritarian regimes. New forms of citizenship and 
public life are simultaneously enabled by new technology and restricted by market power and surveillance. 
What is certain is that media are not the public sphere per se; they are a vehicle through which such a space 
can be created. 
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III. European Regulation, Digital TV 
 Take-up, and Digital Switch-over
Developments in digital television have been followed by announcements of both national analog switch-oﬀ  
plans and EU target dates for converting to digital TV. While switch-over policy has largely been driven by 
individual countries and national policymakers, there is also a European dimension that requires intervention 
by European public authorities. Th e European Commission has taken an initiative to harmonise analog 
switch-oﬀ  dates with the year 2012 as a target in order to ensure a coordinated approach to switch-over and 
the use of available spectrum. 
At a national level, a substantial number of European countries have completed analog terrestrial switch-oﬀ , 
some others are well-advanced, but many more are lagging behind. With the successful completion of the 
ﬁ rst switch-over process in August 2003, the German federal states of Berlin and Brandenburg have played 
a pioneer role in analog switch-oﬀ . Th e Netherlands was the ﬁ rst major heavily cabled country to turn oﬀ  
analog terrestrial transmission in 2006. Among the digital terrestrial pioneers are Finland and Sweden, both 
completing switch-over in 2007. Th e UK and Spain, having seen their respective pay-TV digital terrestrial 
ventures ITV Digital and Quiero TV going bankrupt in the early 2000s, both changed the model to free-to-
air digital terrestrial TV and with this proposition that basically avoids viewer resistance have since had a swift 
recovery. Th e redirection of digital terrestrial TV towards a primarily free-to-air system has proved compelling 
to many UK and Spanish households.
Concerning the roll-out of digital terrestrial television, the latest MAVISE TV data show that by June 2011—
and as the 2012 deadline approaches—terrestrial switch-oﬀ  had taken place (or was very close to completion) 
in 20 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and Switzerland.11 At the same time, the total number of channels on digital terrestrial networks 
11. MAVISE was developed for the European Commission by the European Audiovisual Observatory, contains data on television companies and 
channels in the 27 EU markets plus the candidates Croatia and Turkey, and is published by the European Audiovisual Observatory: see http://
www.obs.coe.int/about/oea/pr/mavise_june2011_pdf.pdf.en. 
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across Europe was about 1,800, including national, local, and regional. Pay-TV channels represented 53 
percent of the total, while the remaining 47 percent were free-to-air. 
In terms of genre, there was a signiﬁ cant distinction between the variety on pay and free-to-air platforms, 
with pay-TV platforms having a higher number of sports and ﬁ lm channels (at 15 percent and 10 percent 
respectively, compared with 4 percent and 2 percent respectively on free-to-air platforms), and free-to-
air platforms having a stronger presence of the national generalist channels (38 percent compared with 
just 8 percent presence in pay-TV platforms). Despite an emphasis on particular genres (just 1 per cent of 
educational and cultural programming for pay-TV compared with 6 per cent for free-to-air platforms) and 
the prominence of entertainment and ﬁ ction (at 18 percent and 11 percent respectively for pay-TV and free-
to-air platforms), the increase in the number of digital channels has enhanced choice and diversity of output 
in genres such as children’s (at 11 percent and 4 percent respectively for pay-TV and free-to-air platforms), 
and business and news (at 6 percent and 9 percent respectively for pay-TV and free-to-air platforms). 
Most of the countries that have completed digital switch-over are northern and western European. At the other 
end of the scale, switch-over in Europe’s Mediterranean territories as well as central and eastern European 
countries is slow and the countries do not seem capable of catching up with EU targets. Across central and 
eastern Europe, analog switch-oﬀ  has been hampered by political issues, governments’ lack of political will to 
make it happen, and, more broadly, the lack of political consensus over modernization and the consolidation 
of democracy.12 Th e switch-over process in this part of Europe has even been dubbed premature by some 
analysts who claim that these countries are not ready to convert to digital because they lack understanding 
of the issues involved.13 Digital switch-over is not currently a high priority in the ﬁ nancially troubled smaller 
European countries of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Despite agreement on digital switch-oﬀ  dates, the 
European market in 2011–2012 remains fragmented with regard to the adoption of digital technologies and 
digital switch-over plans.
12. P. Iosiﬁ dis, “Digital Switchover in Europe,” International Communication Gazette 68(3) (2006), p. 266.
13. K. Jakubowicz, “Digital Switchover in Central and Eastern Europe: Premature or Badly Needed?” Javnost/Th e Public 14(1) (2007a), p. 21.
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IV. Digital Switch-over, Universality, 
 and Public Service Media
Some outcomes of switch-over are clearly positive for the consumer, as digitization increases choice of 
distribution mode (people can receive programming through digital terrestrial, cable, satellite or broadband 
platforms) and content (digital television oﬀ ers the opportunity to expand the number of media sources and 
programs, which can promote pluralism and encourage new voices).
But digital television involves much more than just extra channels. Technological convergence—the 
intertwining of broadcasting, telecommunications, and computer technologies, based on digitized 
electronics—makes possible the delivery of programs in diﬀ erent formats, for example High Deﬁ nition 
(HD) video, and can also free, at least in theory, the communications consumer from analog TV’s constraints 
of time and place. 
If the beneﬁ ts for consumers are visible, there is some doubt as to whether all citizens beneﬁ t. Th e downside 
is that not all of these services are likely to be available to everyone. While not all consumers have equal 
purchasing power, citizens’ interests are poorly served in terms of access to a universal service.14 Th is is 
particularly evident in the control of bottleneck facilities, which are areas of strategic control in the digital 
TV infrastructure. Bottlenecks (and gatekeepers) are present in various stages of the digital TV supply chain, 
including content, packaging, bundling, delivery, conditional access, reception, and revenue collection.15 
Th ese facilities do not allow for the eﬀ ective participation of all citizens. Th e picture is one of opportunities 
and threats, with diﬀ erent outcomes likely to feature in diﬀ erent countries. Given this fast-moving and 
commercially-driven industry, civil society should have a say in the regulation of the digital chain.
14. P. Iosiﬁ dis, “Growing Pains? Th e Transition to Digital Television in Europe,” European Journal of Communication 26(1) (2011b), pp. 6–7.
15. M. Cave and C. Cowie, “Not Only Conditional Access: Towards a Better Regulatory Approach to Digital TV,” Communications & Strategies 30 
(3rd Quarter) (1998), pp. 77-130. And see MDM Reference Paper 8, Gatekeeping in the Digital Age, by Peter Olaf Looms, at http://www.soros.
org/initiatives/media/articles_publications/publications/mapping-digital-media-gatekeeping-digital-media-20110815.
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So, it is not only the speed of switch-over that matters for an eﬀ ective switch-over policy in Europe; it is also 
the inclusiveness and the principle of universality for achieving a European digital citizenship, which can be 
realized by supporting communities in sharing experiences through digital media and by designing inclusive 
technologies that have the potential to support public communication in a networked European society.16 
Over half a century after it originally appeared, T.H. Marshall’s seminal essay on citizenship and social class 
in postwar Britain and his lucid analysis of the principal elements of citizenship—the possession of civil, 
political, and social rights—remains highly relevant. In Marshall and Bottomore’s analysis, the civil element 
comprises individual liberties, including freedom of expression, while the political element refers to the 
citizen’s right to be involved in social life, and the social aspect includes aspects such as the right of access to 
services.17 According to Varney, while the civil element of citizenship has been expanded, the political and 
social aspects have been diminished in the present context for regulating the communications industry.18 Th is 
is reﬂ ected in the terminology used in the regulatory instruments for the industry, which refer to the public 
as consumers, customers or end-users. Consumers in the digital era beneﬁ t from the expanded choice of 
channels, but commercial players are not typically concerned with ensuring that citizens are suﬃ  ciently well 
informed to participate actively in society.19 
What can be done? One possible way to ensure universal digital services after digital switch-over is to allow 
public service broadcasters to introduce online services and extend their portfolio of platforms and channels. 
Th e case for expanded public communications has lost some of its appeal in a digital multi-channel world, 
as it faces strong opposition from the commercial media sector, but it remains valid nonetheless. In practice 
much will depend on the quality and skills of diﬀ erent national public broadcasters and the degree of public 
support they retain. Most public broadcasters in western Europe have indeed expanded online (in the UK, 
for instance, the digital television revolution has brought the ﬂ agship BBC 24 Hour News), while in some 
eastern European countries broadcasters do not follow suit because they lack expertise, desire or grasp of 
these issues. Public service broadcasters—which have been important conveyors of freely accessible and 
reliable information—should take full advantage of digital opportunities. Despite the widening ﬁ nancial 
gulf between public broadcasters and their commercial competitors, public institutions should be free to 
expand online and on diﬀ erent platforms. Where public broadcasters are trusted media brands, they should 
contribute to the recreation of the public sphere, enhanced civic engagement, and informed citizenship. 
16. According to Neelie Kroes, Commissioner for the Digital Agenda, “digital citizenship” entails such diverse issues as access to online pub-
lic services, the need for skilled workers, and the protection of citizens’ rights online. See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=SPEECH/10/87.
17. T.H. Marshall and T. Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class, Pluto Press, London, 1987, cited in E. Varney, “Regulating the Digital Television 
Infrastructure in the EU. Room for Citizenship Interests?,” SCRIPT-ed 3(3), 2006, pp. 222–242, at: http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/
vol3-3/varney.asp#sdendnote12anc. 
18. E. Varney, “Regulating the Digital Television Infrastructure in the EU. Room for Citizenship Interests?,” SCRIPT-ed 3(3), 2006, pp. 222–242, 
at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-3/varney.asp#sdendnote12anc. 
19. See also S. Livingstone, P. Lunt and L. Miller, “Citizens and Consumers: Discursive Debates During and After the Communications Act 2003,” 
Media, Culture & Society 29(4) (2007), pp. 616–618.
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If they are to achieve this, however, public service broadcasters should be reinvented as Public Service 
Media (PSM), engaging with the full possibilities of digital transmission and the web.20 Th e transition of 
the traditional public service broadcasters into PSM (or public service communications) is one of the most 
challenging debates in contemporary media studies. It basically refers to the widening of the remit of the 
public channels to be available on more delivery platforms for producing and distributing public service 
content. Cross-platform strategies help PSM to retain audience share, reach new audiences and develop on-
demand services, while enabling them to create a stronger partnership with civil society and serve an extended 
form of citizenship. Expanding into emerging digital media technologies and platforms is a diﬃ  cult task and 
brings new challenges, but social change and new technologies require these public institutions to evolve 
from basic broadcasting services into an engine that provides information and useful content to all citizens 
using various platforms.
In fact, digital switch-over has given a boost to many public service broadcasters, as governments in countries 
such as the UK, Germany, Spain, and the Nordic region consider them partners in leading the digital 
conversion and rely on them to build public conﬁ dence in digital TV. Th e UK government gave the green 
light to the BBC to launch digital channels and set up projects like the iPlayer (that allows live streaming of 
all the BBC TV channels as well as catch-up services), as long as these services do not adversely distort the 
market. 
Not all public institutions, however, seized the opportunity oﬀ ered by digital convergence to expand into 
online and on-demand services. Among them is the Greek broadcaster ERT, which does not seem capable 
of adapting to its new role as leader of digital TV services. Market size and the social and political context 
embedded in Greece, for example—where television took its ﬁ rst steps under a dictatorship and was openly 
used for propaganda purposes—play a deﬁ ning role in the decision not to enter new, unfamiliar, and 
commercially risky activities. In the small country of Hungary, the public service remit, as deﬁ ned by the 
Broadcasting Act 1996, concerns exclusively the broadcasting of “public service program items” in radio or 
television programs, and makes no provision for program production or on-demand services.21 
Polish public service broadcasters enjoy a fairly strong position, which makes this system unique among other 
central and eastern European countries. Critics accuse Telewizja Polska (TVP) of sustaining its ratings by 
abandoning serious, non-commercial output. Be this as it may, TVP’s large market share has not “protected” 
it from this region’s endemic diﬃ  culties, that is, pressure exerted by political forces and inadequate funding.22 
Th us, diﬀ erences between countries—in size, economic development, culture, and politics—render the one-
size-ﬁ ts-all policy toolkit irrelevant. 
20. D. Tambini and J. Cowling (2004) (eds), From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Communications, Institute for Public Policy Research, 
London, 2004; G.F. Lowe and J. Bardoel, “From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media: Th e Core Challenge,” in G.F. Lowe and 
J. Bardoel (eds) From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media, RIPE@2007, NORDICOM, Göteborg, 2007, pp. 9–28; P. Iosiﬁ dis 
(ed.), Reinventing Public Service Communication: European Broadcasters and Beyond, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2010.
21. M. Lengyel, “From ‘State Broadcasting’ to ‘Public Service Media’ in Hungary,” in P. Iosiﬁ dis (ed.), Reinventing Public Service Communication: 
European Broadcasters and Beyond, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2010, p. 250.
22. P. Stępka, “Public Service Broadcasting in Poland: Between Politics and Market,” in P. Iosiﬁ dis (ed.), Reinventing Public Service Communication: 
European Broadcasters and Beyond, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2010. p. 234.
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In an expanding commercial environment it is diﬃ  cult to predict if PSM will ﬂ ourish or become marginalized. 
Th ere is strong opposition from commercial media. Th e newspaper industry, whose print readership is in 
sharp decline, tries to build new revenue streams from ventures such as tablet-optimized apps. But charging 
online customers is not a viable option so long as PSM-run free sites are available. Commercial opposition 
to well-funded public broadcasters’ free online operations, often led by the newspaper industry, has resulted 
in some public broadcasters having to limit their website ventures (in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland 
regulatory restrictions limit public service broadcasters’ “Telemedia” interactive initiatives),23 as well as license 
fee funding cuts (the BBC’s license fee, for example, has been frozen until April 2017). 
Th e case for publicly funded communications remains valid conceptually, for public service broadcasters, 
particularly from northern and western European countries, have been deep-rooted in their democratic and 
cultural psyches and have been resistant to political and commercial pressures. In practice, however, much will 
depend on national policies, the history and culture of individual countries, the quality and skills of diﬀ erent 
national public broadcasters, and the degree of public and political support they retain. For example, will 
national governments still be keen on online public service activity once digital switch-over is completed? As 
long as the EU continues recognizing the right of member states to determine the organization and funding 
of their public service broadcasters in accordance with the protocol of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (which 
strikes a balance between the realization of the public service remit entrusted to public service broadcasters 
and the achievement of the common supranational interest in the undistorted functioning of the internal 
market), policy decisions at national and EU levels are likely to determine the future of public institutions. 
Finally, the growing tendency to treat public broadcasting as an “anomaly” and a threat to the interests of the 
commercial sector may yet be reversed as, in the wake of the ﬁ nancial and economic crisis of 2008–2009, 
nation-states and the international community re-evaluate the neo-liberal model of society, and the role of 
the state and the public sector in protecting the public interest.24
23 Th e term “telemedia”—which bridges “tele services” such as telecommunications and “media services” such as television—entered German 
federal law with the 2007 Telemedia Act (Telemediengesetz), available in German at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/tmg/index.html
24 K. Jakubowicz, “‘PSB 3.0’: Reinventing European PSB,” in P. Iosiﬁ dis (ed.), Reinventing Public Service Communication: European Broadcasters 
and Beyond, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2010, pp. 21–22.
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V. Conclusion
Public interest priorities diﬀ er in Europe’s North and South, with the former being more mature in its 
treatment of goals like pluralism, diversity, freedom of expression, and civil liberties, and the latter struggle 
to come to terms with political, economic, and socio-cultural reform. Despite their diﬀ erences, the southern, 
central and eastern parts of Europe share some characteristics: lack of accountability of media market players, 
the inﬂ uence exerted by commercial operators, the impact of corporate power in setting the political agenda, 
and limitations of freedom of speech and of participation by citizens in society. 
Are technological developments like digital TV capable of addressing this situation? Th e public interest 
outcomes from the introduction of new technologies will depend on how these technologies are used. In 
the end, the beneﬁ ts from technological advances like digital television and the internet will depend on 
Europe’s citizens. Like all new media revolutions, these technologies can provide a useful tool or the basis for 
a participatory democracy and informed citizenry, but they are not themselves inherently pro-democratic. For 
example, countries where television has been dominated by state broadcasters may use the new technology and 
in particular digital switch-over to create yet more channels controlled by the state, rather than independent 
ones which are likely to foster political pluralism. 
While policy intervention to boost digital TV uptake may be justiﬁ ed at an EU level to guarantee a 
coordinated approach to the switch-over process and to the use of the available spectrum, the pressure at the 
micro level for new EU member states to be part of the digital economy may not result in positive change, 
for it might lead to ill-informed and short-sighted policies. Th is danger is particularly apparent in countries 
where digital TV penetration rates are low and awareness of the digital switch-over process is lagging behind. 
While countries adopting a digital TV policy, such as the UK, Germany, and the Nordic countries, seem to 
conform most closely to EC ideals, in terms of speed of switch-over, the smaller and Mediterranean European 
territories as well as eastern and central European countries do not seem capable of catching up with the EC’s 
target switch-oﬀ  date. 
What can be done? Th e free-to-air model of television, in which public broadcasters have a leading role, 
has played a signiﬁ cant part in Europe’s digital TV strategies in two areas: by enhancing consumer interest 
in digital TV services; and by making the EC’s target of analog switch-oﬀ  across Europe in 2012 seem 
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achievable. Perhaps more importantly, the launch of digital terrestrial TV services has made digital services 
more aﬀ ordable, addressing citizens’ interests by maintaining the universality objective in accessing television 
services in the digital era. 
For public service broadcasters to remain prominent content providers, in turn enhancing accessibility and 
promoting digital citizenship, they should expand to more platforms and introduce online services that have 
truly public value and are available for the whole national population. 
Where television has been dominated by unaccountable state broadcasters, policymakers should take steps to 
reform the broadcasting system in order to enhance plurality and meet public interest concerns. Intervention 
to support plurality could ensure the availability of socially valuable content from a variety of sources, 
including independent local, community, and national non-proﬁ t channels. 
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